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Abstract
What if the statutory scal depreciation of buildings was higher than their e¤ective
economic depreciation? This would imply that markets would value buildings more
than their social fundamental value. I prove that this would allow house price bubbles
to emerge and open the door to sudden crashes. This paper provides an example of how
a misaligned scal policy measure could generate potentially destabilizing self-fullling
prophecies even in an economy with fully rational and forward-looking individuals.
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"A lot of my write-o¤ was depreciation...shell always allow it, because the people that
give her all this money, they want it. Thats why....I pay tax and I pay federal tax too. But I
have a write-o¤, a lot of it is depreciation, which is a wonderful charge. I love depreciation."
Donald Trump vs Hillary Rodham Clinton, Second presidential debate, October 9, 2016.
1 Introduction
When a rm buys a building it is entitled to deduct parts of its value from taxes at rates
which are supposed to approximate the actual economic depreciation rate of the building.
However scal schedules are often the result of political compromise and sometimes accused
to be too generous to real estate holders willing to minimize their income taxes. For example,
according to the federal Modied Accelerated Cost-Recovery System (MACRS) introduced
by the US Tax Reform Act of 1986, businesses may recover investments in buildings through
depreciation deductions up to a substantial amount: typically a house is assumed to be
depreciated in 27.5 years, but the owner can opt for accelerated depreciation, so short as to
5 years. Hence, the government could be actually subsidizing house prices. We claim that
this is su¢ cient to render a house price bubble sustainable. Moreover, this allows for self-
fullling prophecies to generate house price bubble collapses even in a rational and otherwise
very stable economy.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 a simple stylized house price
model. Section 3 characterizes and proves the existence of rational bubbles and sunspot
equilibria in this model. The nal section concludes.
2 A Simple Model of House Prices
Let us assume that innitely lived families - identical and with constant population normal-
ized to 1- choose consumption, savings and investment by maximizing their intertemporal
utility functional represented by
1X
j=0
j
c1 t+j   1
1  
where time t = 0; 1; ::: is unbounded and discrete,  is the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution,  = 1
1+
is the subjective discount factor, with subjective interest
rate  > 0. Individuals work for rms and are paid wages wt per unit time. Family wealth,
at, grows according to:
at+1 = atrt + wt   ct.
The associated Euler equation is:
c t = c
 
t+1(1 + rt). (1)
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3 Real Estate Bubbles
Financial intermediaries - which we will call "banks" - invest individual savings into "houses",
which are in limited supply. We assume that the price of a house paid by a bank, pt is refunded
in a fraction  2 [0; 1] per period by the government. Parameter  is set by the legislation on
the depreciation of physical investment. For simplicity, we will assume balanced government
budget, with lump sum taxes nancing the scal depreciation of the buildings.1
Following Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006), we assume for simplicity that real estates
are unproductive and irreproducible assets. Hence any positive price would be a bubble.
An extension would complicate notation, but would imply that the bubble would be the
di¤erence between the price of the asset and the expected present value of the rents it
generates.2 We look for the possibility of bubbles with constant probability  2 [0; 1] of
bursting each period. Financial intermediaries, perfectly competing and risk neutral, view
real estate investment as equivalent to consumption loans. Hence the no arbitrage equation
between the activities is:
pt+1(1  )
pt(1  ) = (1 + rt). (2)
3.1 Equilibrium
In this section we characterize the rational bubble equilibrium in this economy. For a housing
bubble to be stationary it is necessary that the price of the asset grows at the same rate as
the real GDP, assumed exogenous and denoted by  > 0. Hence:
pt+1
pt
= 1 + . (3)
In a steady state consumption will grow at the same rate, that is
ct+1
ct
= 1 + . (4)
Therefore, eq. (4) and the Euler equation (1) imply:
1 + rt = (1 + )
 (1 + ) . (5)
Combining eq.s (2), (3), and (5) we obtain:
 = 1  (1 + ) (1  )
(1 + )1 
 (; ; ; ). (6)
1Hence non-distortionary taxation is fully compensated by trasfers and does not interphere with our
assumed intertemporal wealth constraint.
2Our model is purposefully very stylized, but it could be complicated in several directions. For a very
useful survey of recent housing macroeconomics, see Piazzesi and Schneider (2016).
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Notice that (; ; ; ) denotes the equilibrium probability of the bubble bursting as a
function of the subjective interest rate, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the econ-
omys growth rate, and the amortization rate. From (5) we see that  is non-negative if
and only if:
  1  (1 + )
1 
1 + 
 min. (7)
The threshold level, min, of scal depreciation for the existence of a stationary rational real
estate bubble with constant probability of exploding is positive, because the convergence
of representative agent utility restricts parameters to 1 +  > (1 + )1 . Therefore if
government forced the scal amortization rate to be low enough the real estate bubble would
not exist in this economy. Existence becomes possible only if the government allows for a
level of  at least as large as min. Interestingly, the higher  the higher the probability of
the bubble collapsing each period.
Therefore we can conclude with the following:
Proposition 1. A stationary rational house price bubble equilibrium exists if and only
if the scal depreciation rate  is above a minimum level min. The higher the allowed
depreciation rate the higher the probability of house price bubble crash.
Notice that the crash probability is an example of a rational stationary sunspot equilib-
rium (Cass and Shell, 1983), that would not emerge in this economy (see, Tirole 1982) if the
government did not introduce a house depreciation rate.
4 Conclusion
This paper has shown that in a rational world in which real estate price bubbles would not
exist, governments could induce the emergence of house price bubbles by allowing estate
owners to scally depreciate their real estates at a rate higher than the actual physical
depreciation of the estate. Moreover, the very existence of such house price bubbles allows
for a probability of their crash. Finally, the crash probability is increasing in the scal
depreciation rate.
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